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MILK REGULATION IN NEW YORK*
THE RECENT decision of the New York State Legislature to abandon the
fixing of milk prices prompts an inquiry into the success of depression milk
regulation. The emphasis in milk administration was first shifted from the
protection of health and the maintenance of quality1 to economic control of
the milk business by the New York 'Milk Control Law,, passed in 1933 in
response to pressure of producers and large distributors.2 Because of their
weak bargaining power, producers had been forced to absorb the conse-
quences of a market undermined by a large increase in the production of milk
and a depression decrease in consumption, while the large distributors, though
*This Comment is a sequel to Legislative Regulation of the New York Dairy
Industry (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1259, a Comment written shortly after the enactment
of the New York Milk Control Act which discusses the economic background, con-
stitutionality, and probable success of the statute.
1. For a discussion of these types of control, see TonBFo LEGAL Asvzcrs oF Mim:i
CONTROL (International Association of Milk Dealers, 1936).
.2. Originally enacted in 1933 as an emergency measure for one year, the law was
revised in 1934 largely in accordance with the recommendations of the milk adminis-
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able to preserve their margin of profit, had suffered a reduction in total sales
and profits as a result of lowered consumer demand and price-cutting by the
smaller dealers.3 The New York Milk Control Law was enacted in an attempt
to relieve the depressed condition of dairy farmers and to stabilize the chaotic
marketing and distribution structure.4
To achieve both of these purposes, the milk control law provided that the
Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets might in his discretion fix mini-
mum prices to be paid to farmers5 and minimum and maximum prices to
be charged on sales by dealers to other dealers, by dealers to stores, by dealers
to consumers, and by stores to consumers. 6 In fixing prices the Commissioner
was to follow a rather broad standard: "The commissioner shall investigate
what are reasonable costs and charges for the producing, hauling, handling,
processing and/or other services performed in respect to milk, and what
prices for milk in the several localities and markets of the state, and under
varying conditions, will best protect the milk industry in the state and insure
a sufficient quantity of pure and wholesome milk to adults and minors in
the state, and be most in the public interest. The commissioner shall take
into consideration the balance between production and consumption of milk,
the costs of production and distribution, and the purchasing power of the
public." 7 Milk dealers handling milk that was not well advertised, and who
had been engaged in business continuously since April 10, 1933, were per-
mitted to sell milk to stores in New York City at one cent per quart less
than milk sold under well advertised trade names-a differential which could
be passed on by the stores to consumers.8 Provision was made for notice
and hearing to interested parties before the promulgation of any order in
regard to the price of milk, and review of such orders was to be by certiorari.9
tration. Report of the New York Milk Control Board (1934) 27-30. Many provisions
of the 1933 law were then made permanent while the price fixing features, although
reenacted, retained their emergency character. The references to the New York Milk
Control Law in this Comment are to the law as revised in 1934.
3. See Comment (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1259.
4. Other states besides New York attempted to care for the ills of the dairy
industry. BLAcK, THE DAIRY INDUSTRY AND THE A. A. A. (1935) 311-349. The milk
control statutes are collected in Comment (1937) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 375, n. 1.
5. N. Y. AGR. & MXTs. LAW § 258-m (1) (a). Producer cooperatives were per.-
mitted to blend the proceeds of their sales of milk in the various classes, deduct co-
operative expenses, and pay their members a net pool price, even though the actual
amount received by the farmer was less than he would have received if he had been
paid directly the minimum prices fixed by the commissioner. § 258-n.
6. § 258-m (1) (b). The commissioner could also fix "the amount of handling
and/or processing charges to be included in the price charged or paid by milk dealers
for milk involved in transactions between dealers." § 258-m (1) (c).
7. § 258-m.
8. § 2 5 8-q.
9. § 258-m (3).
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The state made unlawful the sale of milk purchased from out-of-state farmers
at a price lower than that required to be paid to farmers within the state. 0
The first act of the milk administration was to set minimum resale prices11
which varied for different localities.1 ' But since the benefits oi the increased
prices received by dealers as a result of this type of price-fixing were not
passed on to farmers, orders were soon issued establishing minimum prices
to be paid to producers.13 The setting of prices in both of these situa-
tions was upheld against constitutional attack in the cases of Nebbia z.
New York' 4 and Hegeman Farms Corporation v. Baldwin, the Supreme
Court holding in the latter case that the spread between minimum prices to
be paid to farmers and minimum resale prices did not have to lie sufficient
to guarantee dealers a fair return.
The effectiveness of price-fixing in accomplishing its objectives depended
on an efficient enforcement system. The machinery set up by the Act re-
10. § 258-rn (4). New York also made a noble attempt to aid other states in the
enforcement of their milk control laws by providing that dealers buying milk from
New York state farmers for shipment into another state where prices were also fixed
should pay New York farmers as much for their milk as the dealers would have bhen
required to pay farmers in such other state. § 258-m (1) (a).
11. Report of the New York Milk Control Board (1934) 3-4.
12. Thus, for instance, dealers selling Grade B milk to consumers were required
to charge a minimum of 12 cents a quart in specified "upstate" counties, townships,
and cities; 11 cents in certain counties, cities, and villages; and 10 cents in other des-
ignated cities and villages and in all areas within a radius of three miles of such cities
and villages. Division of Milk Control, Official Order No. 103, May 6, 1935. At the
same time, the minimum price required to be charged for such milk in the metropoli-
tan area, made up of New York City and four adjacent counties, was 13 cents. Divi-
sion of 'Milk Control, Official Order No. 106, May 6, 1936. A further variation in price
existed since dealers in New York City handling unadvertised brands of mill: could
sell to stores at one cent below the established minimum price. See note 8 sutra.
The constitutionality of this differential was upheld in a five to four decision on
the ground that "the discrimination embodied in the law is but a perpetuation of a clas-
sification created and existing by the action of the dealers" themselves before the pas-
sage of the milk control law. Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 251
(1936), (1936) 84 U. oF P.. L. REv. 786. See note 60 infra.
13. The utilization or classified price plan was adopted, after considerable discussion,
as the method for computing prices to he paid by dealers to farmers. Report of the
Milk Control Board (1934) 4. Nine different classes were set up, the prices to be
paid by dealers for milk used in the various classes ranging, at the time the first orders
were issued, from approximately 1f! to 4 cents per quart
14. 291 U. S. 502 (1934). The case has been widely discussed. See e.g., Hale, The
Constitution and the Price System: Some Reflections on Vebbia v. New Yori (1934)
34 Cor. L. R.Ev. 401; Horack and Cohen, After the Lebbia Case: the Administration
of Price Regulation (1934) 8 U. oF CIN. L. REv. 219.
15. 293 U. S. 163 (1934), (1934) 34 Co. L. REv. 1551. (1934) 33 MIic L. Ra,.
961. Prices set in prior-made contracts were held superseded by the prices fixed by the
commissioner. Knoeller v. Karsten, 157 fisc. 130. 283 N. Y. Supp. 53 (N. Y. City Ct.
1935).
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quired all dealers to secure licenses, 16 and vested the commissioner with
power to grant, suspend, or revoke licenses in accordance with specified
standards,17 any such action being subject to review by certiorari' 8 The
Commissioner might also bring an action to enjoin violations of his orders
without alleging or proving that there was an adequate remedy at law.'0
Provision was made for detecting violations by setting up an inspection force
and by empowering milk administration employees to inspect the books of
dealers,2 0 besides requiring dealers to keep records 2' and submit reports. 22
That there was widespread disregard of the price-fixing provisions is not
surprising since farmers could not be expected to resist the persuasion or
threats of powerful distributors and since retailers were eager to purchase
milk at less than the prescribed prices. The milk administration was faced
with a difficult task in ferreting out violations and in exerting sanctions once
transgressions were discovered. The farmers and retailers were of little aid
in unearthing violations, for the former hesitated to incur the displeasure
of a powerful dealer and the latter were hardly willing to discard a com-
petitive advantage. Detection was made more difficult by the varied and
devious methods used by dealers to camouflage price-cutting.23 Thus they
often "leased" their country receiving plants at exorbitant rentals to farmers,
or to company cooperatives formed under dealer auspices.24 And cooperatives
sometimes covered up secret rebates to dealers by entering "management"
expenses on their books. The books of one cooperative, for instance, revealed
that during one month it had, rebated $23,507.98 to the dealer and had
distributed $34,761.09 among the farmers.2' As a result of this manipula-
tion, the producers actually received less than 3 cents a quart instead of the
nearly 5 cents to which they were entitled. Under another device used com-
monly, a dealer would buy through a broker instead of following the usual
16. For administrative reasons, however, it was provided that the Commissioner
might exempt from the license requirements dealers "who purchase or handle milk in a
total quantity not exceeding three thousand pounds in any month, and/or milk dealers
selling milk in any quantity in markets of one thousand population or less." § 257.
The license fees for milk dealers ranged from $25 to $5,000 a year depending upon
the average amount of milk the dealer handled daily. § 258-a.
17. § 258-c.
18. § 258-d.
19. § 258-e, Baldwin v. Burdick, 243 App. Div. 250, 276 N. Y. Supp. 675 (3d Dep't
1935). Violations of the milk control statute or of the Commissioner's orders issued
thereunder could be prosecuted as misdemeanors. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502
(1934) ; People v. Bratowsky, 154 Misc. 432, 276 N. Y. Supp. 418 (N. Y. City Magis-
trates' Ct. 1934).
20. § 256. See note 54, infra.
21. § 258-f.
22. § 258-g.
23. Report of the Division of Milk Control (1937) 6.
24. Report of the Milk Control Board (1934) 13-14.
25. Report of the Division of Milk Control (1937) 9-10.
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procedure of purchasing directly from farmers. The broker would deduct
large fees from the farmers' checks in return for his generally nominal
services, returning the bulk of such "fees" to the dealer.20 This scheme was
also often employed to break down resale prices, for the rebates received by
the broker were then distributed to customers of the dealer who had pre-
viously paid the price set by the milk administration, -27 and the dealer's books
thus indicated that he had paid for and sold milk at the established prices.
And other less subtle methods of giving rebates to retailers, ranging from
the supplying of free ice to the insertion of fictitious names on the payrolls
of distributors, were widely utilized.
Even when the milk administration was able to discover violations, en-
forcement was severely hampered by dilatory court procedure. The initial
requirement that all milk dealers should be licensed, it is true, was enforced
without much difficulty,m especially after courts refused to give unlicensed
dealers any contractual remedies.2 0 And while the mere threat of an inves-
tigation was occasionally sufficient to bring recalcitrant dealers into line,:
more generally dealers violated price fixing orders with impunity, knoing
that the Commissioner would find it difficult to secure an injunction against
such violation within a reasonable time,3' and that an attempt by the Com-
missioner to revoke or suspend a license32 or to condition its continuance
upon the performance of certain acts3 3 could be effectively blocked by stays
26. N. Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1937, § 2, p. 1, col. 4. An attempt to secure control over
the activities of brokers was made at the recent session of the Legislature by the p3ssage
of a bill which has been signed by Governor Lehman, requiring such brokers to be
licensed annually at a fee of $25. N. Y. Times, May 21, 1937. p. 2, col. 4.
27. Report of the Division of 'Milk Control (1935) 93-94.
28. Baldwin v. Lenahan, 293 N. Y. Supp. 742 (Sup. Ct. 1935). Report of the
Milk Control Board (1934) 24; Report of Division of Milk Control (1935) 124-126.
29. Rosasco Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen, 249 App. Div. 193, 292 N. Y. Supp. 1, 249
App. Div. 228, 292 N. Y. Supp. 9 (1st Dep't 1936).
30. Report of the Division of Milk Control (1937) 19.
31. Report of the Milk Control Board (1934) 8.
32. For cases in which licenses have lleen revoked, see Hegeman Farms Corp. v.
Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163 (1934); Eisenberg Farms, Inc. . Baldwin, 265 N. Y. d62, 193
N. E. 434 (1934), aff'g, 242 App. Div. 743, 274 N. Y. Supp. 1C03 (3d Dep't 1934);
Matter of Karsten Dairies, Inc., 243 App. Div. 656, 276 N. Y. Supp. 659 (3d Dep't
1935); Linden Farms 'Milk & Cream Co. v. Ten Evck, 246 App. Div. S69, 2,34 N. Y.
Supp. 721 (3d Dep't 1936) ; Report of the -Milk Control Board (1934) p. 24. Before
the courts will affirm an order of the Commissioner revoking a license they must
be satisfied that the alleged offender has been given a full and fair hearing. Coney
Island Dairy Products Corp. v. Baldwin, 243 App. Div. 178, 276 N. Y. Supp. 6S2 (3d
Dep't 1935); Beyerdale Dairy, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 292 N. Y. Supp. HS0 (3d Dep't
1937).
33. Report of the Division of Milk Control (1936) 118. Courts have indicated in
several cases that, in their opinion, the commissioner has utilized his power in regard
to the conditioning of licenses in such a way as to usurp the functions of the courts.
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- frequently granted by the courts - pending the final determination of
certiorari proceedings.34 Thus, dealers whose licenses had been revoked as
far back as 1933 were still operating in March, 1937,35 and they frequently
continued the practices which had led to the revocation of their licenses. 80
Perhaps the severest blow to effectuation of the price-fixing provisions
was the decision of the Supreme Court in Baldwin v. Seelig3 that New
York could not constitutionally prevent a milk dealer, who had purchased
milk outside the state at a price lower than that he would have been required
to pay New York producers, from bringing that milk into the state and
selling it either in the original containers or in bottled form. Not only did
this decision greatly accelerate the importation of out-of-state milk,3 8 but it
also gave dealers another powerful weapon to be used in persuading New
York State farmers to sell milk at a price lower than the established mini-
mum.39 To meet the situation caused by this decision, the Commissioner
of Agriculture and Markets instituted conferences with authorities of other
states in the New York milkshed and of the United States in order to secure
uniform milk control by means of interstate or federal compacts. 40 Lengthy
negotiations aimed at an interstate compact or a federal marketing agree-
ment under the A.A.A. for the New York market proved unavailing because
Matter of Grandview Dairy, Inc. v. Baldwin, 239 App. Div. 640, 269 N. Y. Supp. 116
(3d Dep't 1934) ; Royce v. Rosasco, 159 Misc. 236, 287 N. Y. Supp. 692 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
34. The courts refused to grant injunctions against the milk administration, how-
ever, and required compliance with -the statutory provision that review of the com-
missioner's orders should be by certiorari. Dairy Sealed v. Ten Eyck, 248 App. Div.
352, 289 N.Y. Supp. 85 (1st Dep't 1936), rev'g, 159 Misc. 716, 288 N.Y. Supp. 641,
(Sup. Ct. 1936); Co-operative Dairymen of Frazer v. Ten Eyck, 158 Misc. 726, 286
N. Y. Supp. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1936); cf. Matter of Ideal Farms, Inc. v. Baldwin, 149 Misc.
902, 269 N. Y. Supp. 467 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (application by milk dealer for prohibition
order denied). As a practical matter, stay orders had the same effect as injunctions.
35. Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk Control
Law (1937) N. Y. Lrwis. Doc. No. 81, p. 16.
36. See statement by H. A. Cronk, president of the Borden's Farm Products divi-
sion of the Borden Company, N. Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1937, § 2, p. 1, col. 4.
37. 294 U. S. 511 (1935).
38. Report of The Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk Control
Law (1937) N. Y. LEG. Doc. No. 81, p. 15, where it is stated that following the Seelig
decision "the importation of milk into the metropolitan area produced in other states or
produced and shipped through another state to give it the status of interstate milk
increased tremendously and came into this valuable market like an avalanche, crowd-
ing out the intrastate milk governed by control board prices. It has reached such great
proportions today that at least 40 per cent of the fluid milk consumed in the metro-
politan area is interstate milk and is not governed by the Milk Control Board." See
Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Sale and Distribution of Milk and Milk
Products (1937) 75th Cong., 1st Sess., H. R. Doc. No. 95, p. 101.
39. Report of The Division of Milk Control (1936) 101.
40. The milk control, statute empowered the commissioner to take such action.
N. Y. AGR. & MKTS. LAW § 258-p.
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of the opposition of large distributors.41 Even if the federal government had
undertaken the task of regulating the New York market, however, it is
doubtful if such control would have been sustained,4 for the lower federal
courts have almost uniformly invalidated control of the milk business by the
A.A.A. in other localities either as a regulation of intrastate commerce 4a or,
where the milk shipments are clearly in interstate commerce, as an attempt
to control the production of milk.
44
The difficulty of detecting violations and of securing speedy enforcement
and the inability to control out-of-state milk purchased at lower prices than
those set by the Commissioner combined to render the price-fixing pro-
visions almost nugatory. Dealers did not pay farmers established prices, and
practically every retailer in New York City purchased milk at less than the
prices fixed.45 The only regulations reasonably well complied with were
those setting prices to be charged consumers. The operation of price fixing
was thus generally unsatisfactory. The price of milk to consumers increased
considerably, 46 while prices paid farmers rose more slowly than the general
41. Statement by Peter G. Ten Eyck, Commissioner of Agriculture and Mari:ets,
N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Mar. 5, 1937, p. 5, col 4.
42. See generally as to federal milk regulation, BL.cKC, THE DAMIY I:DusTRY AN
THE AAA (1935); Nouas, MARxErm AGnEm 'Is U:NaR THE AAA (1935) 195-
230; Duane, Markctlng Agreements Under the A.A. A.: Their Contcnts and Constitn-
tionclity, (1933) 82 U. oF PA. L. REv. 91; Comments (1934) 34 CoL L Rmy. 1336,
(1936) 46 YALE L. J. 139.
43. Berdie v. Kurtz, 75 F. (2d) 898 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); Darger v. Hill, 76 F.
(2d) 198 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); United States v. Greenwood Dairy Farms, 8 F. Supp.
398 (S. D. Ind. 1934) ; Douglas v. Wallace, 8 F. Supp. 379 (IN. D. Okla. 1934) ; United
States v. Neuendorf, 8 F. Supp. 403 (S. D. Iowa 1934) ; Royal Farms Dairy v. Wal-
lace, 8 F. Supp. 975 (D. Md. 1934); Allen v. Wallace, 12 F. Supp. 515 (N. D. Okla.
1935). Contra: United States v. Shissler, 7 F. Supp. 123 (N. D. I1. 1934), in which
Judge Holly stated that "there is no escaping the finding of the Secretary set forth in
the license that the intrastate and interstate transactions are so inextricably intermingled
that interstate commerce in fluid milk in the Chicago Sales area cannot be effectively
regulated without regulating that portion which is intrastate."
44. Edgewater Dairy Co. v. Wallace, 7 F. Supp. 121 (N. D. Ill. 1934); Columbus
Mfilk Producers' Co-operative Association v. Wallace, 8 F. Supp. 1014 (N. D. I1. 1934);
United States v. Seven Oaks Dairy Co., 10 F. Supp. 995 (D. Mass. 1935); Ganley v.
Wallace, 17 F. Supp. 115 (D. C. 1936). The courts have split on the question as to
whether or not the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Butler, 297 U. S.
1 (1936), invalidated the marketing provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
United States v. Edwards, 14 F. Supp. 384 (S. D. Cal. 1935) (malid). Contra: United
States v. Buttrick, 15 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1936). The problem is thoroughly dis-
cussed in Comment (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 130. To correct this situation a bill to re-
enact the marketing provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act was introduced
in the current session of Congress. 75th Cong.. 1st Sess., H. R. 5722. The bill has
been passed by the House. N. Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1937, p. 17, col. 4.
45. See note 35, supra.
46. Report of the Division of Milk Control (1937) 24; cf. N. Y. Times, Feb. 26,
1937, p. 2, col. 5, Feb. 27, 1937, p. 20, col. 4.
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price level 47 and remained below the cost of production. 48 Moreover, New
York state farmers lost some of their fluid milk market since dealers found
it to their advantage to buy more of their fluid milk supplies outside the
state. The large distributors, however, continued to make large profits while
price fixing orders were in effect, 49 although they were hampered somewhat
by the one cent price diiferential allowed in favor of unadvertised brands.
Since the majority of the producers, the large distributors, and consumers
were not in favor of price fixing,50 the provisions of the New York Milk
Control Law in regard thereto were allowed to lapse on March 31, 1937.r1
The Milk Control Law made other provision, besides fixing prices, for
obtaining its ends of securing to farmers a more adequate return for their
product and of stabilizing the marketing and distribution structure. Several
provisions were designed to insure to the farmer treatment that he could
not obtain because of his weak bargaining position. Thus, a partial check
upon dealers in their payments to farmers was provided by requiring dealers
to file monthly reports of their purchases and sales of milk and the prices
at which the milk was bought and sold.5 2 When these reports revealed that
farmers had been underpaid, action was taken to secure adjustments.53 Since
the more astute milk dealers would undoubtedly submit flawless reports, the
milk administration also undertook, despite strenuous opposition, the task
of auditing the books and records of many dealers.54 In addition, dealers
47. Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk Control
Law (1937) N. Y. LEa. Doc. No. 81, pp. 13-14. A study of prices received by farmers
supplying milk to a number of markets in the United States revealed that prices paid
to farmers in the New York market had recovered least of all. Spencer, The Milk
Situation in New York (1937) N. Y. State Coll. of Agr. Bull. 365, pp. 15-16.
48. Report of the Division of Milk Control (1935) 96. For a valuable collection
of data as to cost of production of milk, see Martin, The Public Utility Aspects of the
Production and Distribution of Fluid Milk (Unpublished thesis in the Yale University
Library, 1934) 17-27.
49. N. Y. Times, March 9, 1937, p. 42, col. 1, Mar. 12, 1937, p. 42, col. 1, Apr. 22,
1937, p. 37, col. 1.
50. Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk Control
Law (1937) N. Y. La. Doc. No. 81, p. 19.
51. The immediate effect of the withdrawal of price fixing has been a sharp drop
in the cost of milk to the consumer. N. Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1937, p. 1, col. 4, Apr. 2,
1937, p. 1, col. 7, Apr. 6, 1937, p. 25, col. 6, Apr. 20, 1937, p. 3, col. 5; Dairymen's
League News, May 11, 1937, p. 1, col. 1.
52. Cf. Eisenberg Farms, Inc. v. Baldwin, 265 N. Y. 662, 193 N. E. 434 (1934),
aff'g, 242 App. Div. 748, 274 N. Y. Supp. 1003 (3d Dep't 1934).
53. Between the passage of the milk control law and the close of 1936, 953 dealers
who had been underpaying producers were compelled by the milk administration to
pay nearly $300,000 to 27,481 farmers. Report of the Division of Milk Control (1937)
20. Other cases involving large sums of money were pending in court. Ibid.
54. Although § 256 of the milk control statute clearly conferred upon the milk
administration the power to make such audits, the Borden Company, for example, re-
1366 [Vol. 46 : 1359
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were generally required to file bonds with the Commissioner to guarantee
payment to farmers.55
The statute also provided for the equalization of returns to farmers when
all producers and dealers in the New York milkshed were brought into a
plan.56 The object of this provision was to alleviate the evils of a pricing
mechanism that had enabled dealers to capitalize on the ever-present milk
surplus to drive down prices paid to farmers. The price paid for milk varies
according to its ultimate use, higher prices being paid for milk destined for
consumption in fluid form and lower prices for milk eventually converted
into milk products, such as butter, cheese and evaporated milk. And since
only from 40 to 60 per cent of New York State milk is sold for fluid use,
7
farmers must secure a share of the fluid milk market to have any chance of
meeting the high costs of producing milk in New York State, for milk used
for manufacturing purposes sometimes sells at no more than 1312 cents a
quart. There has been no arrangement generally employed in New York
whereby the fluid market is divided equitably among the farmers, the large
distributors having seen to it that no one cooperative has attained sufficient
size to perform this function adequately.58 The attempt made by the Milk
Control Law to equalize returns was rendered impotent because the central
control required by the statute could not be set up for the New York milk-
shed.
Various other provisions were designed to assist in stabilizing the market
structure by preventing the further addition of distribution facilities to an
already overburdened distribution system. The statute forbade the Com-
missioner to issue new licenses unless he was "satisfied that the applicant is
qualified by character, experience, financial responsibility and equipment to
properly conduct the proposed business, that the issuance of the license will
not tend to a destructive competition in a market already adequately served,
fused to open its records to the milk administration. N. Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1937, p. 23,
col. 1, Feb. 20, 1937, p. 3, col. 5. The legislature thereupon enacted a law providing for
the compulsory auditing of the books of dealers and cooperatives. N. Y. Times, May
21, 1937, p. 2, col. 4. Since the bill carries an appropriation of only $50,800, its effective-
ness is doubtful since each of the three larger distributors in New York City pay ap-
proximately $25,000 for an audit of their books. Report of the Milk Control Board
(1934) 6.
55. § 258-b. See Andes Co-operative Dairy Co. v. Baldwin, 238 App. Div. 726, 26
N. Y. Supp. 18 (3d Dep't 1933) aff'd, 263 N. Y. 578, 189 N. E. 705 (1933) ; Ten Eyc:
v. Columbia Casualty Co., 246 App. Div. 867, 284 N. Y. Supp. 691 (3d Dep't 1936);
Baldwin v. Hegeman Farms Corp., 154 Misc. 285, 277 N. Y. Supp. 705 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
As to the constitutionality of bonding statutes in general, see Legis. (1936) 21 C-ax;.
L. Q. 366.
56. § 258-o.
57. Report of the Division of Milk Control (1935) 92-93.
58. Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk Industry
(1933) N. Y. LEG. Doc. No. 114, pp. 151-155.
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and that the issuance of the license is in the public interest."5 The Com-
missioner was further empowered to designate the place or places where
the dealer could receive milk from farmers as well as to restrict dealers to
certain types of milk business and to the sale of milk in specified geographi-
cal areas. 60 Under these provisions, many persons have been denied entrance
to the milk business, or else admitted on a limited basis, hut none of the
existing duplication has been eliminated. 61
The New York Milk Control Law thus failed to achieve either its aim
of improving the economic position of the farmer 2 or of recasting the
market structure. The essential theory of the Milk Control Law, only par-
tially carried out, was that the milk industry should be regulated as a public
utility, with prices fixecf and entry into the business limited. The inability
of the state to control out-of-state milk, however, severely limited the effective-
ness of the price-fixing provisions. This defect may be remedied in various
ways: health inspection requirements might be used to curb the inflow of
out-of-state milk to some extent.0 3  State control might more readily be
effectuated by the passage of a federal statute making it unlawful to bring
milk into any state in violation of state laws,0 4 but since the dairy industry
has grown beyond the confines of any state, it might be more advisable,
until effective federal control can be secured, to adopt a system similar to
that in force in Indiana where certain markets are controlled jointly by the
federal government and by the Indiana Milk Control Board. 3
The problems of the milk business, however, will not be solved even if
price fixing works out effectively and brings about a much needed increase
59. §258-c. The Court of Appeals appears to be favorably inclined towards this
provision. Elite Dairy Products v. Ten Eyck, 271 N. Y. 488, 3 N. E. (2d) 606 (1936).
60. § 258. Crowley's Milk Co. v. Ten Eyck, 270 N. Y. 328. 1 N. E. (2d) 119 (1936),
aff'g, 246 App. Div. 654, 283 N. Y. Supp. 166 (3d Dep't 1935). Section 258-q of the
statute, denying to dealers who entered the milk business after April 10, 1933, and
who did not have a well-advertised trade name, the right to sell milk to stores at one
cent per quart below the established minimum price also tended to keep down the
number of dealers. The Supreme Court, however, declared this provision to be invalid
under the 14th Amendment in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 266 (1936).
61. Report of the Division of Milk Control (1935) 110.
62. In fact, the past four years of milk regulation in New York state may have
substantially decreased the bargaining power which cooperatives formerly possessed.
See Dairymen's League News, Apr. 20, 1937, p. 4, col. 2.
63. The policy followed by health authorities of New York City and New York
State in regard to the inspection of out-of-state farms is described in Report of the
Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Milk Industry (1933) N. Y. LEG. Doc.
No. 114, p. 34.
64. See Corwin, National-State Coopcration-Its Present Possibilities (1937) 46
YALE L. J. 599, 610-615.
65. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from C. W. Humrickhouse, Execu-
tive Secretary, Indiana Milk Control Board, April 22, 1937. Because of the conflict-
ing interests of the various states and the opposition of large distributors, the possibility
of securing interstate compacts appears remote.
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in producer prices.66 For the objects of milk regulation should be not only
to secure an adequate return for farmers but also, if possible, to lower the
price of milk to consumers. This might be accomplished by the application
of a second principle of public utility regulation, the elimination of wasteful
competition. 7 Costly and unnecessary duplication exists at every stage of
milk distribution- in country receiving stations, transportation, pasteur-
izing and bottling plants, and wholesale and retail facilities.0 8 Thus, dealers
in Philadelphia were able by means of larger retail loads and heavier block
distribution to sell milk at approximately two cents per quart less than in
New York City. 9 And if prices to consumers were materially decreased,
consumption of milk, now well below the minimum deemed sufficient by
medical authorities for an adequate diet, might increase to such an extent
that there would be a shortage rather than a surplus of milk?0 While power-
ful farmer and consumer cooperatives might be able to increase distribution
efficiency, 71 no thoroughgoing changes can be expected without government
66. The Rogers-Allen Bill, recently enacted in New York State after consider-
able controversy [IN. Y. Times, May 20, 1937, p. 2, col. 21 will not bring about any
fundamental improvements in milk marketing save in so far as it may tend to strength-
en farmer cooperatives. This new law, which adds four sections to the N. Y. Aca. &
MiTS. LAw, permits cooperatives in the various "production areas" of the state to
form producers' bargaining agencies to negotiate with distributors' bargaining agencies
concerning prices to be paid to farmers for their milk 1§25S-1 (a)], and, subject to
the approval of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets. may enter into market-
ing agreements with distributors' bargaining agencies [§ 258-1 (b)]. The price fixing
and other provisions of such marketing agreements may be made effective as to the
entire production area by an order of the Commissioner [§258-m(5)]. And even
though no marketing agreement has been made, the commissioner, upon the petition of
and approval by certain designated percentages of producers, may fix prices to be paid
to producers in the particular production area. § 258-m (1).
67. For discussions of public utility regulation see BLAcK, op. cit. supra note 42,
at 255-7; Martin, supra note 4S, at 162-178; Report of the Mayor's Committee on Mil:
(N. Y. City, 1917) 85; Report of the Milk Inquiry Commission (British Columbia,
1929) 105-112; Manley, Constitutionality of Regulating Milk as a Public Utility (1933)
18 CORN. L. Q. 410. At the present session of the New York Legislature, careful con-
sideration was given to a Bill that declared the milk business to be a public utility,
placed it under the jurisdiction of the public service commission, and subjected it to
the usual public utility regulations. The McCall Bill, Senate Introductory No. 1657,
Print No. 1959 (1937).
68. CHASE, THE TRAGEDY OF WASTE (1926) 224-225; Martin, supra note 48, at
102-120.
69. Report of the Mayor's Committee on Milk (N. Y. City, 1917) 81.
70. See Martin, supra note 48, at 61-93.
71. See Report on the 'More Economic Distribution and Delivery of Milk in the
City of Chicago (Chicago City Council, 1917) Municipal Reference Bull. No. 8, p. 12,
where examples of milk distribution by farmer cooperatives are given and it is stated:
"After all is said, the final adequate solution of milk distribution will come only
through municipal delivery or the organization of producing distributors. A cooperative
